World Congress in Philosophy (WCP 2016)
The Philosophy of Aristotle
Athens, 10-15 July 2016
School of Philosophy, National & Kapodistrian University
of Athens, Greece
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ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY:
Constantinos
N. Tsiantis
ARISTOTLE’S
FOUR CAUSES AND THEIR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE: THE DEBATE ON CAUSALITY
Key
words: Causes, Aristotle, Bacon, Education,
Democracy
1. The importance of philosophy in the
midst of a generalized crisis lies in its ability to seek explanation and find the
causes shaping the painful course
of human condition.
The paper underlines that Plato and
Aristotle saw politics as central part of their
philosophical inquiry with purpose to serve the well being of man and
his/ her eudaimonia. Thus Aristotle,
by seeking the causes/ aitia of
physical changes: the truth for "what can not be otherwise" (realm of
necessity), he was developing also the
logical scheme for understanding "what it was to be otherwise’’ (realm of freedom):
the realm of poiesis and techne that characterizes polis: the topos of man
as social, creative and political being. Politics is for Aristotle the leading
architectural art (Ethics, 1094a30-31) which controls economy and what he calls
chrimatistiki and kapilikon (Politics, 1257b1-5).
Through induction and reasoning
Aristotle developed the Organon of
scientific search which demands answers to four basic questions-causes (Analytica, 94a20-23): the material cause, the formal cause, the efficient
cause, and the final cause-telos
(Physics II 3). All four of these
questions must be asked in regard to any inquiry and work of art (ergon), since this is the way to
knowledge and good life (Analytica,
71b9–11).
2. By the beginning of the 12th
century, the Aristotelian causes were an integral part of the philosophical
tradition and the realm of science was distinguished into Theoretical -
composed of Physics, Mathematics and Theology (Metaphysics), and into
Practical, composed of Ethics, Economy, Politics and logic. That distinction
changed during the period of new
technical inventions and discovery of new continents, of emergence of stock
market and banks and especially of experimental science which marked the
Renaissance and Reformation in Europe (15th-17th century). The Aristotelian
method received the sharp criticism of nominalism (Ockham) and later the four causes were divided by the Neo Organon developed by F. Bacon for the reconstruction
of science. As result: the material cause and the efficient cause, by losing their direct
bond with form and telos, were used for Physics-Mechanics,
while the formal cause and the final cause for Metaphysics-Mathematics. Politics and Economy
lost their place in the corpus of science.
3. The paper refers to the
consequences of above changes in later philosophy and socio-political
life, noticing in particular the absence
of Politics and Economy
from the curriculum of general studies. By thinking on the consequences
the author claims (Poetics, 1450b10-12) that: whenever a gap emerges either in
philosophy either in legislation and politics life covers it by the informal
action or economic initiative of risqué individuals or groups
working for their own purpose or benefit. The negative impact of such an
arbitrary social action is fostering individualism, the distortion and
darkening of Logos, the gradual control of political processes and
finally the prevalence of Economy (economic elites) over Politics.
In conclusion: It is necessary as
society and thinkers to restore and
renew our bond with the Aristotelian causes and make scientific and
philosophical truth the guide to regain democracy and the responsibility of our lives.
Constantinos
N. Tsiantis
ARISTOTLE’S FOUR CAUSES AND THEIR SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE: THE DEBATE ON
CAUSALITY
1. The need for
causality
1.1. We live in
an age of unprecedented scientific and technological advances accompanied,
however, by an equally unprecedented moral obsolescence of man and stubbornly
unsolved problems throughout the globe: poverty, misery,
wars, unemployment, terrorism, violence, fanaticism, intolerance, crowds of
homeless and refugees, destruction of the ecosystem, marginalization of the
weak and living conditions insulting man and giving history
the character of chaos and absurdity. And the question is: Why all this?
Isn’t man a rational being? Why he
doesn't enjoy life? Why he doesn't honor the great gift that nature- in this
remote corner of the universe- brought, put under its shield and offered him? What is it of us that destroys
us;
1.2. Early
Greek philosophy and science opened for
man the road of rationality, permitting him to move from Myth to Logos: from the kingdom of Olympian gods, who held his destiny, to demos: to the Assembly of citizens
who through free debate (illuminating dialogue) decided on the common
issues of polis
(city-state). Democracy: the dominion of demos
was first established (594 B.C) by Solon (a man of prudence and practical
wisdom), as a solution to the
intense social conflict between rich and poor which had broken in the economic
and productive life of Athens. The trust of social opponents to Logos (to the justice of reason), became the basis of Democracy, which
flourished later in the era of Cleisthenes, Efialtis and Pericles marking the
‘’gold age’’ of Athens.
1.3 The achievement of Democracy fostered the course of Greek philosophy and science and
enriched rational thinking with the
point of view concerning the causes of
things. Democracy was a basic cause for a turning of philosophy from the issues of nature to those
of polis (the realm of man) and also for the development of ‘’cause-effect’’ reasoning which
characterizes Aristotle's epistemology. But in the development of
Aristotle’s philosophy, besides
the social life, all the previous course
of philosophy, science and art was
studied and critically scrutinized in order to be ensured a safe basis for truth.
2. The PreAristotelian roots of causality [in the final version of the text]
3. The Aristotelian method of the four causes.
3.1. Through
induction (ἐπαγωγὴ) and reasoning (συλλογισμός, syllogism) Aristotle developed
his epistemological method titled Organon.
Induction starts from the sensible and concrete things and moves towards the universal and abstract; it is ‘’the
starting-point which knowledge even of the universal presupposes, while
syllogism proceeds from universals’’. However, there are starting-points which
are not reached by syllogism and are acquired by induction
(Nic.Eth.,1139b30-40).
The Aristotelian method defines a set of
questions for the explanation of change
both in nature and human society[i]. Its subject is both the
realm of necessity, where things might not have otherwise [ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα,
μηδ' ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν] (Nic.Eth.,1139b24-25), and the realm of choice: where things might have
otherwise [τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν] (Nic.Eth.,1140a1-2). The first realm
is the domain of science [ἐπιστήμη]; the second realm is the domain of poiesis (making) and praxis (acting) [ποιητὸν καὶ πρακτόν]
(Nic.Eth.,1040a1-2). Concerning the foundation of Organon significant notions are found in Aristotle’s Physics, Metaphysics and Nicomachean
Ethics.
3.2.Potentiality
and Actuality
The basis of Aristotle’s
method is his perception of Being both
as potentiality and as actuality. For a change to occur, the potential for
change must be. Everything changes from potential being into active being (ἐπεὶ
δὲ διττὸν τὸ ὄν, μεταβάλλει πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν) (Met., 1069b16-17). Aristotle derived this
maxim by using Democritus’ principle that: "all things were together
potentially but not actually'' and by relating it to the ‘One’ of Anaxagoras
and the ‘Mixture’ of Empedocles and Anaximander (Met.,1069b17-26). According to
this sense of Being ‘’not only can a thing come to be, incidentally, out of
that which is not, but also all things come to be out of that which is, but is
potentially, and is not actually’’ (Met.1069b9-22) .
3.3. Coming into
being: concept and principle of change
3.3.1. In searching the notion of change Aristotle asks first for the principle of change. Thus he
arrives to the position that ‘‘things
come into being either by art or by nature or by luck or by spontaneity’’ [ἢ γὰρ
τέχνῃ ἢ φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τύχῃ ἢ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ] (Met.1070a7-8). On this base he
can make the distinction between nature and art. As he states: ‘’Art is a principle of movement in something
other than the thing moved (in art the ‘‘origin is in the creator and not in
the thing made'' ), nature is a principle in the thing itself (for man begets
man), and the other causes [luck and spontaneity] are privations of these two’’
[ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ （ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον
γεννᾷ, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ αἰτίαι στερήσεις τούτων] (Met.,1070a6-11).
3.3.2. Before to arrive to his position on the
principle of change, Aristotle determines the notions of (a) opposites and
philosophy, (b) substratum, (c) matter, (d) substance and essence.
(a). Aristotle’s Metaphysics starts with the generally hold
principle of contraries, in the large list of which ‘’one of the two columns is
privative (στέρησις)’’, not in the simple sense of negation (the absence of the
thing in question), but in the sense that ‘’in privation there is also employed
an underlying nature of which the privation is asserted’ (Met.,1004b30). As he
states: ‘’At least all name contraries as their first principles-some name odd
and even, some hot and cold, some limit and the unlimited, some love and
strife. And all the others as well are evidently reducible to unity and
plurality (this reduction we must take for granted), and the principles stated
by other thinkers fall entirely under these as their genera’’ [ἔτι τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία στέρησις,
καὶ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, καὶ εἰς ἓν καὶ πλῆθος, οἷον στάσις
τοῦ ἑνὸς κίνησις δὲ τοῦ πλήθους] (Met.,1004b).
Adopting what
‘’nearly all thinkers agree’’ (Met.1004b30), he holds that: ‘’All things are
either contraries or composed of contraries, and unity and plurality are the
starting-points of all contraries [πάντα γὰρ ἢ ἐναντία ἢ ἐξ ἐναντίων, ἀρχαὶ δὲ
τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ ἓν καὶ πλῆθος] (Met.1005a3). He stresses also that the search
of contrariety (ἐναντιότης) does not belong to sophistry, dialectics or to some
particular sciences but to one science (philosophy) that is examining being qua
being [φανερὸν οὖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν θεωρῆσαι] (Met.1005a3).
In it are examined also ‘’the attributes which belong to it qua being- not only
substances but also their attributes, both those above named and the concepts
'prior' and 'posterior', 'genus' and 'species', 'whole' and 'part', and the
others of this sort’’ (Met.1005a15).
(b) Aristotle proceeds now to the question
about the substratum (το ὑποκείμενον) of change. He defines it with the
words: ‘’The substratum is that of which
everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything
else’’ [ἔστι γάρ τι καθ᾽ οὗ κατηγορεῖται
τούτων ἕκαστον, ᾧ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἑκάστῃ （τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τῆς οὐσίας κατηγορεῖται, αὕτη
δὲ τῆς ὕλης）] (Μετ.1028b43-45,1029a9-10). His
definition goes deeply into the root of things, as he states that: ‘’The
ultimate substratum is of itself neither a particular thing nor of a particular
quantity nor otherwise positively characterized; nor yet is it the negations of
these, for negations also will belong to it only by accident’’ [ὥστε τὸ ἔσχατον
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ οὔτε τὶ οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν
ἐστιν: οὐδὲ δὴ αἱ ἀποφάσεις, καὶ γὰρ αὗται ὑπάρξουσι κατὰ συμβεβηκός] (Met,1029a28). How such a substratum is
named?
(c) Aristotle names it ‘’matter’’ (ὕλη) and perceives
it as follows: "Sensible substance (αἰσθητὴ οὐσία) is changeable. Now if
change proceeds from opposites or from intermediates (ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἢ τῶν
μεταξύ), and not from all opposites (for the voice is not-white, (but it does
not therefore change to white)), but from the contrary (ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου), there
must be something underlying which changes into the contrary state (ἀνάγκη ὑπεῖναί
τι τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν); for the contraries do not change (οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία
μεταβάλλει). Further, something persists (ὑπομένει) , but the contrary does not
persist; there is, then, some third thing besides the contraries, viz. the
matter (ἔστιν ἄρα τι τρίτον παρὰ τὰ ἐναντία, ἡ ὕλη) [1069β]. This matter, then,
must be capable of both states: the potential (ἐν δυνάμει) and the active (ἐνεργείᾳ) (Meta,1069b)[ii]. By being such, it is the last subject of change and the factor of continuity (Met.,1014a30): prime matter (ἐσχάτη
ὕλη). ‘’The prime matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one
potentially, and the other actually’’ [ἡ ἐσχάτη ὕλη καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν,
δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ὥστε ὅμοιον τὸ ζητεῖν τοῦ ] (Met.1045b18-20). This
notion of matter, being in line with the outcomes of contemporary
science, has gained the high interest of contemporary epistemology[iii].
Aristotle completes his notion of matter
with the notion of ‘’noetic mater’’ (νοητή ὕλη), which has been neglected by new epistemology. As he states: ‘’Matter is unknowable
in itself. And some matter is sensible (αἰσθητή) and some noetic (νοητή),
sensible matter being for instance
bronze and wood and all matter that is changeable, and noetic matter being that
which is present in sensible things not qua sensible, i.e. the objects of
mathematics’’ [ἡ δ᾽ ὕλη ἄγνωστος καθ᾽ αὑτήν. ὕλη δὲ ἡ μὲν αἰσθητή ἐστιν ἡ δὲ νοητή, αἰσθητὴ μὲν οἷον χαλκὸς καὶ ξύλον καὶ ὅση
κινητὴ ὕλη, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ᾗ αἰσθητά, οἷον τὰ
μαθηματικά] (Met.1036a10-14).
(d) By using
the notions of universal (τὸ καθόλου) and genus (τὸ γένος), Aristotle arrives
at the particular individual thing, the essence of which identifies with the
‘’what it was to be’’ (τί ἦν εἶναι); this is its substance (οὐσία)
(Met.,1031a22). He writes: "The
word 'substance' (οὐσία) is applied, if not in more senses, still at least to
four main objects: for both the essence (τί ἦν εἶναι) and the universal (τὸ
καθόλου) and the genus (τὸ γένος), are thought to be the substance of each
thing (οὐσία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἑκάστου), and fourthly the substratum (τὸ ὑποκείμενον)’’[iv] (Met.,1028b40-45). Thus: there is a matter proper to it each
thing (Met.1044.17-22) and ‘’there is knowledge of each thing only when we know
its essence; the same holds for other things as for the good’’ [ἐπιστήμη τε γὰρ
ἑκάστου ἔστιν ὅταν τὸ τί ἦν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι γνῶμεν, καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως
ἔχει] (Met.1031b7).
3.3.3. Through
this mode of reasoning Aristotle concludes: (1)
That ‘’the cause for what occurs starts from the deprivation and the
subject, which we call matter’’ (αἲτιον δ’ ὃτι γίγνεται ἐκ της στερήσεως και τοῦ
ὑποκειμένου, ὃ λέγομεν ὓλην, 1033α9-11), (2) ‘’Everything that changes is
something and is changed by something and into something. That by which it is
changed is the immediate mover; that which is changed, the matter; that into
which it is changed, the morphy (form)’’ (Met.1069b39-49,1070a1-5), and (3) Every
art (τέχνη) and every inquiry (μέθοδος), and similarly every praxis (πρᾶξις) and choice
(προαίρεσις), is thought to aim at some good (ἀγαθόν); the good (τἀγαθὸν) and the best (τὸ ἄριστον)
is the purpose at which all things aim[v] (Nic. Eth, 1094a). But purpose cannot exist without thought’’[vi].
3.4. The four causes
3.4.1. The four
causes define for Aristotle the method of knowing and explaining change in
nature but also the method of explaining change and acting in society. There are four
causes concerning a thing: (1) the morphological /formal cause (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) , (2) the material cause (τὸ τίνων ὄντων ἀνάγκη τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι) or ‘’that out of which a
thing comes to be and which persists,
e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the genera of
which the bronze and the silver are species’’,
(3) the kinetic/ efficient cause (τί πρῶτον ἐκίνησε), and (4) the final cause (τὸ οὖ ἕνεκα)’’ (PostAnal.2.ii and Physics, 2.ii). In Metaphysics these causes are
described as follows: "Causes are
spoken of in four senses. In one of these we mean the substance and the essence
(τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) (for the 'why' is reducible finally to the
definition, and the ultimate 'why' is a cause and principle); in another the
matter (ὕλην) and substratum (ὑποκείμενον), in a third the source of the change
(ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως), and in a fourth the cause opposed to this, the
purpose (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) and the good (τἀγαθόν) (for this is the end of all
generation and change)’’ (Met.983a29-35).
3.4.2. All poiesis/making is coming, according to
Aristotle, either from art, or power or
intellect (Metaphysics, 1032a30-33).
Art ‘’is a state concerned with making, involving a true course of reasoning,
and lack of art on the contrary is a state concerned with making, involving a
false course of reasoning; both are concerned with the variable. Architecture
is an art and is essentially a reasoned state of capacity to make[vii].
3.4.3. Poiesis (making) and praxis (acting) differ: ‘‘Both things
made and things done are included in the variable, but they differ. The reasoned
state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned state of capacity to
make. Hence too they are not included one in the other; for neither is acting
making nor is making acting’’. In addition: ‘’The origin of praxis is choice (πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις):
choice is the origin of movement of praxis
(its efficient cause) but not its end (its οὗ ἕνεκα). The origin of choice is
desire and reasoning with a view to an end (ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος).
This is why choice does not exist without reason and intellect (ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ
διανοίας) and without a moral state (οὔτ᾽
ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως); for good praxis
(εὐπραξία) and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and
character (ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἤθους)’’ (Ηθ.Νικ,1139α35-40).
3.3.4. Aristotle
insists on the difference between praxis
(acting) and poiesis (making) and focuses on their difference in relation to
ends: the end of praxis is reached
with the completion of its activity, while the end of poiesis goes beyond the completion of its activity (telos, end): beyond the product (ergon). This difference is made clear in
Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle
states that: ‘’Intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but only the intellect
which aims at an end and is practical (πρακτική); for this rules the productive
intellect, as well (αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει); to create is the cause
of any creator (ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν), and that which is made [ergon] is not simply an end (οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς)
but (also) a why (πρός τι) and for whose sake the work (καὶ τινος τὸ ποιητόν)’’ (Nic.Eth., 1139b1-4). The above lines of
Aristotle’s text (‘’ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ
πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρός τι καὶ τινος τὸ ποιητόν’’),
however, we consider that have been
misused in their transfer to the West (a parenthesis was inserted which
distorted its meaning, viz.Ross) (Nic.Eth.,1140b6-8).
3.4.6. Politics and rationality
The realization of
good belongs to the task of the most dominant and architectural science, of
politics. According to Aristotle: ‘’Politics is most truly the master art; for
it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and
which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should
learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall
under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric. Since politics uses the rest of
the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what
we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the
others, so that this end must be the good for man’’ (Nic.Eth., 1094b). Politics
requires men who can see what is good for themselves and what is good for men
in general, men of courage, prudence and
practical wisdom. That’s why ‘’we think Pericles and men like him have
practical wisdom, viz. because they can see what is good for themselves and
what is good for men in general’’ (Eth.Nic,1140b8-11).
4. The separation of causes and the dispute of causality
Until the beginning of
the 12th century, the Aristotelian Organon was an integral part of the philosophical
tradition and the realm of science was distinguished into Theoretical and
Practical: Ethics, Economy, Politics and Logic were an integral part of
Practical science, while Physics, Mathematics and Theology (Metaphysics) of
Theoretical science.
The above division
changed during the period of new science
and new economy which marked the era of Renaissance and Reformation in Europe
(15th-17th century). During that period the Aristotelian method received the
sharp criticism of nominalism[viii] (Ockham) and F. Bacon with his Neo Organon divided Aristotle’s causes into two separate regions:
specifically, the material cause and
the efficient cause determined the
area of Physics-Mechanics, while the formal
cause and the final cause the
area of Metaphysics-Mathematics. The Cartesian dualism (the sharp division of
body and soul) gave another hit to Aristotelian causality by suggesting that
the final cause is not necessary in the scientific explanation of nature[ix]. At the same era Politics
and Economy were excluded from the domains of Science and the school curriculum, loosing thus their bond with the
education of citizen.
One hundred years
after Galileo, David Hume argued that the ‘’why’’ is not merely second to the
‘how’’, but is totally superfluous as it is subsumed by the ‘’how’’. In his
"Treatise of Human Nature" he argued that causation is a
learnable habit of mind and what we call ‘’cause’’ and ‘’effect’’ (and infer
the existence of the one from that of the other) is just their constant
conjunction in all past instances (like between the sensation we call ‘’heat’’
and the object we call ‘’flame’’)[x].
This non-causal epistemology found in the 20th
century the generous support of Bertrand
Russell who influenced decisively its status. Russell argued that ‘’all
philosophers imagine that causation is one of the fundamental axioms of
science, yet oddly enough, in advanced sciences, the word 'cause' never occurs
... The law of causality, I believe, is a relic of bygone age, surviving, like
the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm ..."[xi]. The above ideas shook up causation so
thoroughly that it has not recovered to this day.
5. New Organ and
representative democracy
5.1. The division of the Aristotelian causes did not
took into account its social and political consequences. In addition, that
division led epistemology to be divided into two directions[xii]: the causal
and the non-causal, the last of which emphasized the mere relations among things: the notions of association,
necessary connection, contingency, mathematical relation, probability, correlation and spurious
correlation- namely "correlations that do not imply causation" (D. Hume, B. Russell, K. Pearson, P. Suppes,
O. J. Simpson, etc.)[xiii]. That division had an impact not only on science but also on society as well
such that the two lines of epistemology cannot be considered as socially
neutral. These imply a stand in front of the
‘’cause-effect’’ sign of social movement, a stand in front of the liberalization of economic
forces and ‘’cost-benefit’’ analysis. As Marcuse has stated: ‘’What science
is hiding under the cover of neutrality is a form of sovereignty, of power politics’’[xiv].
5.2. Further, the omission of purpose from nature (viz. ecosystem) was
used for the omission of purpose and causes from society, where the growing
economic elite (the association of multinationals, bankers, financiers and stock
markets) took gradually the control of political life. The atmosphere of
non-causality dominated over society,
while at the same moment the economic elite was using the most extreme routes of causation for the
accumulation of capital. The common ground of polis and the participation of citizens in decision
making was lost. The citizens through a
fake democracy were essentially excluded from
political life; they were separated in political parties given
beforehand by others and their role was limited
to vote every four years and shake the flag of their party.
In this sense the new
epistemology, despite its contributions in scientific progress, it functioned
as a hidden disorientation mechanism leading in the political enslavement of society
and the legitimation of economic oligarchy.
6. Causality and new society
6.1. Marx
worked to uncover the rational and causal basis of capitalism. In his Capital he proved that the capital accumulation is
derived through the law of surplus value and described the spectrum of social,
political and ideological mechanisms used
for its domination over people and nations. Marx’s economic analysis of
capitalism is correct. However, the same does not hold for his ideological
analysis and the solution of proletariat dictatorship [accompanied by the
abolition of private property, the persecution of dissidents and religion
beliefs, the abolition of national identities].
6.2. We hold that the cause
of social problem is the absence of Democracy. Is the abolition of Politics and
the abolition of the essence of man to make history: to be a “political animal’’.
6.3. History
and Aristotle are didactic here. The paradigm of ancient Athens shows that the
solution of social conflict can be found
in Democracy: the assembly of
people. Democracy is not just a polity and
government system (the system of minimum disadvantages); it is the only
shield against corruption for the
survival of Politics. And Politics for
Aristotle is the leading architectural art (Nic.Eth., 1094a30-31) and as such
it can master over economy and what he calls chrimatistiki and kapilikon
(Politics, 1257b1-5). Politics and Democracy, therefore, is the only way for
surviving freedom and serving public good and man’s eudaimonia
(well being).
6.4. The need
for Democracy is confirmed i. by the corruption of ‘’representative democracy’’
and the fall of proletariat dictatorship (1989), ii. by the rivers of blood
shed by people in two world wars and by a number of social revolutions. iii. by the number of
presidents and politicians who were assassinated during the last centuries in
attempting to protect public interest and
human freedom. It is confirmed,
finally, by the challenge of an economic elite
which, while being the 0.7% of world population, it holds in its hands
the 45.2% of world wealth, when the 71% of
world population owns just 3%!
Therefore,
either we shall undertake the fight for
Democracy either we shall sink
into fascism.
7. As conclusion
7.1. The way to
confront the problems of contemporary
man is to transcend the impression of confusion, irrationality and infeasibility covering them as well as to make clear the distinction between rationality and causality. Economy acts
strictly causally and it is only through
causality that we can arrive to its political control.
7.2. The return
of Politics in public life is feasible through the adjustment of the ancient
Athenian Democracy to the conditions and circumstances of today.
7.3. The
Aristotelian scheme of four causes defines the political issue of today society
as follows: i. The material cause is
economy, which we need to reshape
to serve our end. ii. The kinetic
cause, is the body of citizens (citizenry), which we have to inform and
energize. iii. The morphological cause,
is the scheme of Democracy we need, in view of the paradigm of Athenian
Democracy, iv.The final cause, is the attainment of common good and human eudaimonia.
7.4. The basic
condition for this project is to renew
our spiritual and epistemological equipment in order to see both the mechanical
and the moral causes making the problem. It is also our task to illuminate
things and enhance confidence in citizens to undertake the responsibility of
their future.
It is time
today to move from the contemporary Myth to Logos and find again the path to Pnyx.
Sources.
[iii]
Sfendoni-Menzou, Demetra. Aristotle today
(in Greek). Thessaloniki: Ziti Publications, 2010, pp.96-107.
[viii]
Nominalism holds that general or
abstract terms (e.g., strength, humanity) and predicate exist, while universals
or abstract objects (that do not exist in space and time) do not exist.
[x]
David Hume, On Human Nature and the
Understanding, (Ed. by A. Flew), Collier Books- Macmillan, New York-
London, 1962.
[xi]
Bertrand Russell, On the Notion
of Cause, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Vol. 13 (1912 - 1913), pp. 1-26, Published
by: Wiley on behalf of The Aristotelian Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4543833.
[xii]
Menno Hulswit,
A Short History of ‘Causation’, http://see.library.utoronto.ca/SEED/Vol4-3/Hulswit.htm
[xiii]
Judea Pearl, The Art and Science of
Cause and Effect, http://bayes.cs.ucla.edu/LECTURE/lecture_sec1.htm
|
[xiv]
Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, Boston: Beacon Books, 1968, p.7. Tr in
Greek, Papazisis Publ.. 1971.
END OF PAPER.
CONSTANTINOS
TSIANTIS
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